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1

H

umans can behave fairly, but can
other species? Recently we tested
chimpanzees on a classic human test
for fairness, the Ultimatum Game, and
found that they behaved similarly to
humans. In humans, Ultimatum Game
behavior is cited as evidence for a human
sense of fairness. By that same logic, we
concluded that chimpanzees behaved
fairly in our recent study. However, we
make a distinction between behavior and
motivation. Both humans and chimpanzees behaved fairly, but determining why
they did so is more challenging.

Keywords: chimpanzee, ultimatum
game, fairness, behavioral economics,
primate
Submitted: 01/29/13
Accepted: 01/29/13
http://dx.doi.org/10.4161/cib.23819
Citation: Proctor D, Brosnan SF, de Waal FBM. How
fairly do chimpanzees play the ultimatum game?
Commun Integr Biol 2013; 6: e23819
*Correspondence to: Darby Proctor;
Email: dprocto@emory.edu
Addendum to: Proctor D, et al. Proc Natl Acad
Sci USA 2013; 110:2070-5; PMID:23319633; http://
dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1220806110.
www.landesbioscience.com

We recently played the Ultimatum Game
(UG) with chimpanzees and found that
the apes showed very similar responses
to those shown by adult humans in previous studies, and indeed also responded
very much like the young children tested
with almost exactly the same paradigm
in our own study. Our conclusion that
this hints at fairness in the apes caused
debate, with some arguing that a preference for fairness requires the rejection
of unfairness (in this case, a rejection of
the unfair offer). Without the latter, our
critics said, the former cannot be considered demonstrated. This is, however, not
a typical criterion used in human studies.
The obvious issue is that all we can do is
measure choices that are made. What is
behind those choices is a separate question. Motivations for fair outcomes are
open to interpretation, in humans as well
as other species.
The UG, developed in economics,
is a two-player game in which the first
player, or Proposer, is given some amount
of money that he/she can split with the
second player, the Respondent, in any
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way. If the Respondent accepts the offer,
then both players leave with the proposed
split. However, if the Respondent rejects
the offer, neither player is rewarded. In
humans, responses to the UG vary by culture,1 but in most populations the majority of offers fall between 40–50% with a
50% split being the most frequent offer.2-4
Thus, human behavior in this task is said
to be “fair” as rewards are often distributed
equitably between the partners. However,
in a similar economic task, the Dictator
Game (DG), in which Respondents cannot refuse offers, humans are more selfish
than they are in UGs,3,4 offering ~23%
of the money.5 Here, we discuss the components of UGs that are indicative of fair
behavior and discuss this in light our
recent findings.
From the Proposer’s perspective in
UGs, there seem to be two motivations,
which may operate independently or in
concert, for making equitable offers. First,
Proposers could be acting out of self-interest.3,6 That is, by making equitable offers
they hope to ensure their offer will be
accepted and thus avoid the possibility of
receiving nothing (should the Responder
reject the offer). However, it is also possible that Proposers act out of some altruistic urge, which makes them act generously
or fairly toward their partner.3,5,7 These
motivations, which cannot be deduced
from the actual choices, cannot be elucidated without explicitly asking the participants. However, self-reported motivations
are notoriously inaccurate even with
objectively measurable phenomenon, such
as height.8 Most of the human UGs report
behavioral measures only, therefore, i.e.,
whether the behavior of the Proposer was
fair or not.
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In the chimpanzee version of this
game,9 we limited the offers to two possibilities. Proposers could either make an
equitable offer that rewarded both chimpanzees equally, or a selfish offer favoring the Proposer him/herself. We found
that in 72% of trials Proposers made
equitable offers, a percentage very similar to humans that make equitable offers
(76%).7 Is this fair behavior? We believe
so. For some reason the Proposers were
motivated to achieve the same outcome as
the one called “fair” in humans.
But what about Respondents? In that
same 72% of trials there were no rejections, as there should be no reason to
reject fair offers. In the remaining 28%
of trials, we also did not see rejections,
which is potentially more difficult to
explain: aren’t Respondents supposed to
reject unfair behavior? In typical human
studies, this is the case, but these studies differ from ours in two important
respects. First, humans are explicitly told
that refusing is an option. In our case, we
could not give chimpanzees these instructions, so we withheld them from the children as well. Refusals would have had to
be spontaneous. Second, and most importantly, in typical human studies, refusal is
the only way to respond to the Proposer.
Proposers and Responders typically interact in a one-shot, anonymous interaction
with a stranger, leaving the Responder
no other recourse. In our study, however, much as in real life, Responders
and Proposers were members of the same
social group, and had opportunities to
interact in ways other than rejection. In
humans, even the opportunity to write a
note to the Proposer reduces the rate of
rejections.10 In our study, Respondents
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showed behaviors, such as spitting water
at proposers or hitting the barrier between
them, which indicated dissatisfaction with
selfish offers. Similarly, the young children also never rejected offers but would
make statements such as “I want more.”
None of these types of behaviors were
directed toward the experimenter, indicating that both chimpanzees and children
regarded the Proposer as the main agent.
These observations are in sharp contrast
to previous attempts to play the UG with
apes,11 in which the apes were not required
to interact with each other, and indeed
never did.12
Proposers behaved fairly, therefore.
But, does the absence of rejections by
Respondents suggest that they were indifferent to fair outcomes? We do not believe
so. The communicative interactions that
we observed among the children and
chimpanzees suggest a preference for fair
behavior, even if this preference never
translated into rejections. However, we
should note that fairness is likely not the
only motivation at work here. If it were,
both humans and chimpanzees would
also play fairly in DGs, but they do not.5,9
Given the similarities in behavioral outcomes between humans and apes, our
working hypothesis is similarity in motivation even though this is an area in which
we need more research on both humans
and other animals.13
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